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Abstract _ 
In an intertemporal general equilibrium model with imperfect competition, we settle a 
relationship between factor utilization and markups, via the eifect of capacity utilization 
rate changes on firms' market power when the demand for goods is uncertain. When 
competition is imperfect, the existence of capacity constraints introduces a distinction 
between demand and sales price elasticities. At given demand price elasticity, the price 
elasticity of sales will be smaller the larger the aggregate capacity utilization rateo In 
such a framework, capacity utilization aifects the propagation mechanism of exogenous 
disturbances in two ways. The first eifect is similar to the eifect that bottlenecks and 
stockouts would have in a perfectly competitive setup; the second eifect is related to 
imperfect competition and works through market power and optimal markup changes. 
We study these interactions and their implications for the dynamic behavior of sorne key 
macro variables in response to various "structural" changes. We show that the same shock 
can have quite diiferent short run eifects depending on the characteristics of the initial 
stationary state (low or high capacity utilization rate). 
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1. Introduction 
The analysis of the determinants of factor utilization and markup rate variations is 
currently at hart of several research programs in macroeconomics. It is now recognized 
that factor utilization and markup rate variations may playa crucial role in explaining 
business cycle fiuctuations, either by contributing to generate endogenous fiuctuations 1 
or by complexifying the economic mechanisms that propagate through the economy the 
effects of exogenous shocks. Our contribution is based on this latter point of view. The 
literature on propagation mechanisms has usually discussed the effects of factor uti­
lization and of markup rate changes separately. Factor utilization rate changes have 
received much attention in purely competitive real business cycle models, where they 
contaminate the so-called Solow residual and make it an inadequate measure of ex­
ogenous technological shocks2. Business cycle models with imperfect competition have 
instead emphasized the effects of markup rate variations, especially counter-cyclical 
variations generated by exogenous demand shocks3. We emphasize in this paper the 
relationship between the two phenomena (factor utilization and markups), via the ef­
fect of capacity utilization rate changes on firms'market power when the demand for 
goods is uncertain. 
In most existing intratemporal models with variable capacity utilization, the uti­
lization rate variable is introduced in the firm's intertemporal decision problem via its 
impact on capital depreciation4 • In this setup, the equilibrium capacity utilization rate 
is such that the marginal revenue that could be obtained from a more intensive capac­
ity utilization and additional sales is exactly compensated by the marginal cost coming 
from faster capital depreciation. Although there may be such' a link between capital 
utilization intensity and physical depreciation, we believe that the latter is unlikely 
to be the main driving force ~ehind actual capacity utilization rate fiuctuations, as 
reported in business surveys. For this reason, we chose to rely on a different represen­
tation, wherein capacity utilization rate changes follow from microeconomic demand 
uncertainty and (temporary) technological rigidities (which imply that firms prefer 
capacity underutilization to costly capital-Iabour ratio changes). Firms may then be 
either sales- or capacity-constrained, the proportion of firms in each case infiuencing 
the aggregate capacity utilization rateo In an imperfectly competitive setup, capacity 
constraints introduce a distinction between dema:nd and sales price elasticities and for 
this reason infiuences optimal markup values. At given demand price elasticity, the 
price elasticity of sales will be smaller the larger the aggregate capacity utilization rateo 
In other words, the fact that sorne firms are producing at full capacity and unable to 
serve any extra demand increases the market power of firms with spare productive ca­
pacities. In such a setup, capacity constraints affect the propagation mechanism in two 
lSee for instance the model developped in d'Aspremont, Dos Santos, Gerard-Varet (1994a), where 
the variability of markup rates leads to the possibility of endogenous business cycles. In de la Croix­
Licandro (1994), factor underutilization may be a source of endogenous fluctuations. 
20n labour hoarding, see e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, (1993)). On capacity utilization, 
see e.g. Greenwood, Hercovitz and Huffman (1988), Burnside and Eichenbaum (1994)) or Cooley, 
Hansen and Prescott (1994))· 
3See a.o. Rotemberg-Woodford (1991), (1992) and (1993), Gali (1994)· 
4 An exception is Cooley et alii (1994) who propose a modelisation clase to ours. 
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ways. The first effect is similar to the effect that bottlenecks and stockouts would have 
in a perfectly competitive setup: the second effect is related to imperfect competition 
and works through market power and optimal markup changes. 
Constructing a model with such features in an intertemporal setup raises different 
difficulties. First, we do want a model wherein the diversity of situations across firms 
is recognized and wherein the underutilization of capital at the macro level does not 
imply identical utilization rates at the micro leve!. Second, if capacity constraints can 
be binding, we must specify a rationing scheme. obtain effective demands and supplies 
and take into account spillover effects. It is of course impossible to tack1e all these 
issues at once within a full-fledged stochastic model. Our primary objective is to build 
a model which remains tractable and at the same time flexible enough to be later 
extended. Our formulation is based on earlier work on macroeconomic models with 
capacity constraints and imperfeclty competitive price setting (see Sneessens (1987), 
and subsequent work by a.o. Licandro (1992), de la Croix and Fagnart (1993))5. 
The key elements of our stylized intertemporal model can be briefly surnmarized 
as follows. The model relies on a particular market organisation with two sectors. the 
intermediate and the final goods sectors respectively. In the intermediate goods sector, 
the firm uses the primary inputs to produce the intermediate goods. These intermediate 
goods are then sold to firms in the final goods sectoL which combine them to produce 
a final good that can be either consumed or invested6 . We assume perfect competition 
on the final goods market, and monopolistic competition on the intermediate goods 
one where product differentiation gives sorne monopoly power to the individual firmo 
The latter announces her selling price on the basis of (rational) expectations, before 
knowing the exact value of the demand for her production. This structure implies 
that an intermediate goods firm can be either sales- or capacity-constrained; it also 
allows different firms to face different quantity constraints. At the aggregate level, the 
productive capacity of the economy will be systematically underutilised. It is worth 
noting that the price pre-setting assumption is not necessary for aggregate capacity 
underutilization. As we will show, in an imperfect competion setup, it suffices that the 
productive capacity be pre-determined. However, the price pre-setting assumption is 
not unrealistic and has the advantage of giving us a symmetric equilibrium in prices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the descrip­
tion of individual behaviours. Section 3 characterizes the general equilibrium of this 
economy and analyzes the properties of its stationary state. Section 4 illustrates the 
dynamic properties of the model with numerical examples. Section 5 concludes. 
5These models have been used extensively to study the causes of unemployrnent persistence in 
Europe (see a.o. Sneessens-Dreze (1986) and Drez~Bean (1990)). Our objective in this paper is to 
show that they also provide an interesting framework for a better understanding of the determinants 
of business cycle fluctuations. 
6AE, in Romer (1987), we interpret an aggregator index a la "Dixit-Stiglitz" as the production 
function used by the firms in the final sector. In the present model, it may also be interesting to 
consider the final good producing firms as a distribution network that makes the (differentiated) 
goods available to final consumers under the form of a basket of goods, the precise composition -and 
price- of which may depend on the availability of the basic ingredients. As a consequence, consumers 
do not feel quantity constrained since the distribution firms keep on proposing a basket of goods which 
satisfies their needs. 
. ir.--.-·..-.----------------------------------­
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2. Behaviours 
2.1 Consumers 
We suppose an infinitely lived consumer whose intertemporal preferences with respect 
to consumption and labour are represented by a time separable utility function. The 
optimal time profiles of consumptions {Ct}{t=l.... ,oo} and labour supplies {Lt}{t=I,...,oo} 
are given by the solution of the following problem: 
max L00 [3t U (Ct,Lt) 
{Cc,Lt} t=1 
subject to the wealth constraint 
At = At- 1 (1 + Tt) + WtLt - Ct - Tt \f t. (1) 
where /3 is a constant subjective discount rate; At and Tt denote respectively the real 
financial wealth -with the price of consumption as numeraire- and a lump-sum tax. 
Function U is strictly increasing in Ct , decreasing in L t , twice differentiable and concave. 
There is no aggregate uncertainty in the model and the sequence of equilibrium real 
wages and rates of return {Wtl Td{t=l.. ..,oo} is perfectly forecast by the consumero Aa is 
given. 
Optimal consumption demand and labour supply profiles must satisfy the following 
two first-order conditions at any time t = 1. ... , oc 
U1(Ct, Lt) - U1(CH1 ' Lt+¡) /3 (1 + Tt+l) (2) 
Wt -
U2 (Ct , L t ) 
U1(Ct , L t )' (3) 
The transversality condition on wealth must also be satisfied: 
lim [3t U1 (Ct, Lt) At 
t-oo 
= O 
The interpretation of these standard conditions is fairly straightforward. 
2.2 Product firms 
The homogeneous final good is produced by the so-called product firms. It is sold on a 
competitive market, and can be used either as a consumption or an investment good. 
All firms use the same production technology. There is no fixed input, which implies 
that the optimization programme of firms remains purely static. We have however to 
take into account the effect of input supply quantity constraints. 
The production technology of each product firm is represented by a constant return 
to scale CES production function defined over a continuum of variable inputs, each one 
denoted by y and indexed by j, with j belonging to the interval [0,1]. More formally, 
the representative product firm's output (denoted Y) is obtained from the following 
production function: 
[1 .1 .6-1 ] ~ ~ = [ Jo v{~ '!It -rdj with () > 1 (4) 
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Each parameter v1 2:: O is drawn from an i.i.d. stochastic process with unit mean 
and distribution function F(v). The total supply of input j is limited to an amount 
bt ki-l (see below), equal to the predetermined productive capacity of the corresponding 
input supplying firm, i.e., the available capital stock times its (here non stochastic) 
productivity. H we asswne a uniform non-stochastic rationing scheme and use the final 
good as nwneraire, we can write the optimization programme of the representative firm 
as: 
max ~ - rol pf yf dj 
{yn Jo 
subject to the supply constraints 
yf ::s bt ~-l 'Vj, 
\\iith ~ defined in (4). It is well-known1 that with deterministic quantity constraints 
and a uniform rationing scheme. effective demands are not well-defined, although re­
alized transactions are. The latter can easily be shown to be 
, {(Pl) -6 ~ v{ if v{::s v{ 
yf= (5) 
bt ~-l if v{ > vl 
where the critical value of the productivity parameter, vi, is such that the demand for 
input j at price Pl is equal to the productive capacity of supplier j, Le., 
_j bt ~-l 
'V j. (6)
Vt = (Pl) -6 ~' 
For notational convenience, let us define d{ as follows: 
di = (pO -6 ~ v{ 
that is, di represents the demand for input j that would be expressed to firm j if there 
were no shortage of that input8 .
 
Because all the product firms are identical and face the same technological and quan­

tity constraints, we shall in the sequel use the same symbol Y to represent both the
 
individual and the aggregate production of final goods. The aggregate production of
 
final goods can be obtained by substituting (5) into (4). Note that the marginal pro­

ductivity of a supply-constrained input remains larger than its marginal costo With
 
constant returns to scale, this implies positive profits despite the perfect competition
 
assumption9 .
 
7See for instance Green (1980), Svensson (1980). 
8The variable di actually corresponds to the so-called Benassy (1975) effective demand concept, 
as opposed to the Dreze (1975) effective demand concepto The choice between the two concepts is 
in our case unconsequential. It has no impact whatsoever on the determination of input prices nor of 
any other variable, 
9Indeed, by using Euler theorem, one obtains y; = 101 ~ y1 dj > 101 p1 Y!. dj. 
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2.3 Input firms 
2.3.1 Individual Firm's Problem 
Each input j is produced by a single finn (henceforth input finn). In order to obtain 
a simple productive capacity concept, we assume that the production of each interme-
diate good combines labour and capital through a Leontief technology with technical 
coefficients equal to at and bt respectively. The input firm's productive capacity is 
predetermined and equal to the capital stock IG-l times its productivity bt . Labour is 
supposed to be a purely variable input. It is bought on a competitive market and can 
be adjusted instantaneously to its optimallevel. From equation (5), the latter is given 
by 
, y¡ 1 {' '}ti = - = - min di, btJc:-l 
at at 
In other words, as long as the productive capacity is not fully utilised, the firm adjusts 
her production plan to her customers' orders. 
We assume that the price decision has to be taken before the realized values of the 
stochastic terms vl are known. The exact position of the demand function is thus not 
known with certainty and the price and investment decisions have to be taken with 
respect to expected sales, which are given by 
-j 
E(yl) = E(dl) l Vtv dF(v) + bt kLll~ dF(v) (7) 
where E(dl) = (pO -8 ~ 
The expression E(Xt ) denotes the expected value of the variable X t before observing 
the value of the parameter v/.. The ex ante optimization problem can then be written 
as: 
subject to 
kl = (1 - 6) IG-l + i1, 
where Rt is a real discount factor: 
t 
1Rt = I1 (1 +Tit , 'V t > O. 
i=l 
6 is the depreciation rate of capital and v!. represents that particular value of the input 
demand shock which makes demand equal to productive capacity (see (6)) with ko 
given. 
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In every period t, the optimality condition for price10 can be written as 
J. fJ ~t Wt Pt - (8)fJ 7r~t - 1 at 
where the variable 7r~ is defined as 
_ E(d{) r1v dF(v) (9)E(yf) Jo 
and can be interpreted the weighted probability of a demand constraint. 
The optimality condition for investment is at each period t 
(10) 
The following transversality condition must also hold: 
lim R t kt = O 
t--oo 
The presence of 7r~t in equations (8) and (10) makes their interpretation slighty unusual. 
The optimal pricing rule (8) implies a markup over marginal costs, which is negatively 
related to the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of expected sales. The latter is 
equal to the elasticity of expected sales to expected demand (denoted 7r~t) times the 
price elasticity of expected demand (fJ)ll. In other words, when the probability of 
a sales constraint is large, the firm's actual market power is reduced (Le., the price 
elasticity of sales is higher), whi~h implies a smaller markup rate, and conversely when 
the probability of a sales constraint is small. 7r~t is of course endogenous and depends 
on the firm's price decision (as well as on other variables). The higher the price, the 
larger the probability of a sales constraint ceteris paribus. It is easily seen from (8) 
that the profit margin can be written as ~. - wf /at = Pi/(fJ7r~t). 
The optimal invesment decision (10) imposes that investment in every period be such 
that the marginal revenue expected from an additional unit of capital (left-hand side) 
be equal to its marginal cost (right-hand side). The expected marginal revenue is equal 
to the productivity of capital bt times the profit margin per unit of output, times the 
probability of using this extra unit of capital. 
10The derivation of this condition supposes that each monopolistic firm only considers the direct 
effect of her price decision on demand and neglects aH the indirect effects (e.g. the effect through yt). 
This approximation is certainly perfectly reasonable in a framework where there is a continuum of 
firrns. For a thourough analysis of this question, see d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-
Varet (1994b) who compare this approximation with the solution obtained when aH the indirect 
effects are taken into account. 
11 As prices are pre-set, the equilibrium wage rate has not been observed yet at the time prices have 
to be announced. Since there is no aggregate uncertaínty in the marlel, the equílíbrium wage rate can 
however be perfectly anticipated. See the labour market equilibrium condition below. 
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2.3.2 Symmetric Equilibrium and Aggregation 
At the time they have to take their investment and price decisions, all the input firms 
j have the same infonnation about individual demand and face exactly the same un-
certainty. At a syrnmetric equilibrium, they will thus all choose the same capital stock 
and price level: 
TI j E [O, 1], kt = kt and pt = Pt < 1 
Note that p is always lower than 1. Because the marginal productivity of the con-
strained inputs is larger than their price, Pt is always lower than the price of final 
output Pt (nonnalized to 1) which is also the shadow price index for intennediate 
inputs l2 . 
With all prices identical , aggregate employment, denoted Lt , is equal (up to a scaling 
factor) to individual expected employrnent levels. It is determined by: 
Lt = -!.. {(pt)-8 yt rv t v dF(v) + btKt- 1 ~oo dF(v)} (11)
at Jo JVt 
where K t - l stands for the aggregate capital stock installed at time t - 1 and available 
at time t, and 
bt Kt - l 
Vt - (pt)-8 yt (12) 
represents the ratio of productive capacity to expected demand for intermediate inputs l3 . 
3. General Equilibrium 
3.1 Intertemporal Equilibrium 
For each period t, we may characterize the equilibriwn as follows. 
12Indeed, the shadow price index for intermediate inputs must be computed by using the marginal 
productivities of inputs in the production of final output. Without binding supply constraints, 
marginal productivities are equal to the observed prices at equilibrium. In this model, the marginal 
productivity of each supply constrained inputs remains larger than its price. At a symmetric equilib-
rium in prices, the shadow price index is therefore 
r1 (ay.) 1-9 ] 6 [ t ]6 
1 = Pe = [Jo aJ v1 dj > Jo {Pe)1-9 v1 dj = Pe 
The difference between shadow and market prices expl~ why the term p-9(> 1) remains in the un-
constrained demand function for input j (d~ = p;-9 'Ye vf) even though the equilibrium is symmetric 
in prices. This term measures in fact the spillover effects coming from the constraints on the interme-
diate inputs produced by the input firms that are at full capacity. Obviously, the larger the number 
of constrained inputs, the more pe departs from its upper bound 1 and the larger the spillover effect 
p-9 . In the limit case where all input firms would underuse their productive capacity at equi~ibrium 
(Pe = Pe = 1), there would be no spillover effect. At a symmetric equilibrium in prices, each d~ would 
then be equal to rí vi· 
13The definition of ti gives us another opportunity to outline the effect of binding capacity con-
straints. Each firm that underuses its productive capacity satisfies a demand increased by the spillover 
effect p-B. It is obvious that the critical value ti aboye which firms use fully their capacity has to take 
such an effect into account. 
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a) The labour market equilibriurn is characterized by equations (3) for supply and 
(11) and (12) for demando 
b) The intermediate 'input market equilibriurn is, from equation (8), characterized 
by lfhrdt Wt 9 X iit 
Pt = fj 1 - with 1rdt = P- -L v dF(v) (13)
1rdt - at at t o 
The aggregate value of 1rdt is a weighted measure of the proportion of firms for which 
demand is smaller than the productive capacityl4. 
c) Theproduct market equilibriurn is characterized by: 
(14) 
where public consumption Gt is exogenous and non-stochastic. The optimal consump-
tion level is derived from equation (2); the optimal investment rule is, from equation 
(10), given by 
Pt+I lOO ()Tt+I + 8 = () bt+I _ dF v . (15) 
1rdt+I t.'t+l 
By substituting (5) into (4) and taking into account the equality of all input prices, 
the aggregate production of final goods can be written as: 
9 
9}~ = { [ (pt)-9 X]!jl [lVtVt dF(V)] + (bt J(t-d 9 1 [l~ (Vt)i dF(v) ] }-n=I 
(16) 
d) Financial markets 
Product and input firms are owned by consumers. Both types of firms make positive 
profits at equilibrium; the corresponding shares have thus positive market values. At 
equilibrium, these shares prices .must satisfy the arbitrage condition (expected rates of 
return equal to the riskIess market interest rate). Because share prices do not appear 
in the previous expressions, the financial market equilibriurn conditions will not be 
presented here and are presented in appendix 1. 
e) A dynamic general equilibrium for this economy is a sequence ofprices {Pt, Wt, Tth 
and quantities {Ct , Lt , X, Kth such that the aboye equilibrium conditions are satisfied 
at each time period t (t = 1, ... ,00), with Ko given. 
f) Capacity utilization and markup 
As Vt > O, the aggregate productive capacity is underutilized at equilibrium. Let Dt 
be the capacity utilization rate at the aggregate economy level: 
XDt = -- < 1.bt Kt -
The underutilization of productive capacities at the aggregate level cumulates two 
effects, Le., the underutilization of capital in sorne input firms and the productive 
14 At equilibrium, F(Vt) represents the proportion of firms that underuse their productive capacities 
(Le., those for which v{ E [O,VtD. The variable 7Tdt weights F(Vt) by the relative importance of the 
production of the latter firms in total production, 
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inefficiency in product firms (the marginal productivity of supply-constrained inputs 
remains larger than their price15 ).  
For a given distribution function of F(v), there exists of course a decreasing relation-
ship between the capacity utilization rate Dt and the weighted propotion 1T'dt, which 
determines the markup rateo Indeed, the aggregate capacity utilization rate is linked 
directly to the proportion of firms which produce at full capacity. As the latter pro-
portion is equal to (1 - 1T'dt), the larger Dt , the lower 1T'dt. At given price elasticity 
of demand, this implies a positive relationship between the capacity utilization and 
markup rates. 
It is also worth stressing that the underutilization of the productive capacity de-
pends more crucially on the assumption of a predetermined capacity and uncertainty 
than on the assumption of pre-set prices. lf prices were set ex-post, each firm's optimal 
capacity would still imply a positive probability of underutilization. When the demand 
for its good turns out to be too low, the input firm would never reduce its markup rate 
below ()I (() - 1); it would instead prefer underutilize its productive capacity. There 
would however be no input demand rationing and the equilibrium in prices would no 
longer be symmetric in prices. The crucial assumption is uncertainty. Without un-
certainty~ the installed productive capacity would always perfectly match the demand 
for intermediate inputs. With constant returns to scale, all p! would then again be 
identical. 
3.2 Stationary State Equilibrium 
At the stationary state, equation (2) determines the stationary interest rate as a func-
tion of the subjective time discount rate: 
1- ,B
r=p' (17) 
Let us denote by X the following ratio: 
aL 
X= bK' 
We can next rearrange the three equations (11), (15) and (16) (without time subscripts) 
as follows: 
x = ~ [1V v dF(V)] + [J:co dF(v)] (18) 
() (r + 8) ti- 1 f~ v dF(v)
x - (19)b P fvco dF(v) 
P = {[1V v dF(v)] + (ti)!j1 [lCO vidF(v)] }J:!:r < 1 (20) 
Equation (19) is obtained from the optimal investment rule (15), after eliminating 1T'd 
with (13). From (20), it is easy to show that P is increasing in ti. The larger the number 
15Without quantity rationing, the latter inefficiency would vanish. 
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oí constrained inputs (Le. the lower ti), the more p departs from its upper bound 1 
(see also íootnote 11). 
With the solutions X, ti and p oí this system, the capacity utilizationrate D and the 
proportion 7rd are determined easi1y by using equations (12) and the definition oí 7rdt in 
equation (13). From the equation oí prices (13), the stationary wage level w becomes: 
w = p (1 - _1_) a (21) 
07rd 
The stationary real wage rate is thus lower than the marginal productivity oí labour 
a. The gap between the two is increasing in the proportion oí firms working at íull 
capacity. If aH the firms underused their productive capacity, 7rd and p would be equal 
to 1 and the real wage rate would be simply equal to (1 - l/O) a. 
Note that, because oí the constant return to scale assumption, the stationary state 
values oí the variables ti, D, 7rd, W do not depend on the consumer's intratemporal 
preíerences U. Defining the latter next allows the computation oí the stationary levels 
oí output Y, employment L, consumption e, the capital stock K. Oí course, the íact 
that the stationary values oí D, X, 'ird, P and w do not depend on the intratemporal 
preferences does not prevent the specification oí U to have substantial effects on the 
dynamics of these variables. 
In appendix 2. atable details the effects oí the parameters oí the model on the 
stationary values of D, 'ird, P and w. 
4. Transitional Dynamics and Local 8tability 
This section has two objectives. The first one is simply to check the local stability oí the 
modeP6. The second one is to illustrate the interactions between capacity utilization 
and markup rate changes by analysing numerically the dynamic behavior oí sorne key 
macro variables in response to various structural changes in the environment oí firms. 
This will allow us to show that a same shock can have quite different short run effects 
depending on the characteristics oí the initial steady state ("low" or "high" capacity 
utilization rate). 
For this numerical part, we consider two economies which are identical except íor 
the variance 0"; oí the idyosynchratic shocks -uf, Because oí that, the main difference 
between the stationary equilibria oí these two economies is the value oí the equilibrium 
capacity utilisation rate, which is higher the lower17 the variance 0";. F(v) is assumed 
a lognormal distribution function with a variance 0"; equal to 0.01 in the first economy 
(called hereafter the High D economy) and equal to 0.25 in the second one (called 
hereafter the Low D economy). 
16To solve this nonlinear model, we use a a Newton-Raphson relaxation method proposed by Laffar-
gue (1990) and further developed by Boucekkine (1994). As Boucekkine shows, Laffargue's algorithm 
allows ones to check very easily the existence of a unique stable saddle-point solution. Indeed, when the 
latter algorithm is used, non saddlepoint models are ill-conditioned and induce an explosive behavior 
of the algorithm. 
1ilndeed, the larger O'~, the larger the mismatch between demands and supplies, and consequently 
the lower D t at any productive capacity level (see also appendix 2). 
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For the set of the other pararneters of the modeL we choose the following calibration. 
We assume a utility function of the eRRA variety like 
.cl--r Ll+T 
U(Ct,Lt) = -- --- (22)1-"1 1+7 
and choose the following values for the other parameters of the model: a = b = 1, 
f) = 7 (which implies a mark-up rate of about 40% if 1rd is about 0.5), /3 = 0.971 (so 
that the real interest rate is 3%), G = O, Ó = 0.07, 'Y = 1.5 and 7 = 1. 
The values of the most important variables at the stationary state in these two 
economies are given in the following table: 
yD w p c 
High D economy (u: = 0.01) 0.952 57.5% 0.748 0.995 0.932 0.86 
Low D economy (u: = 0.25) 0.795 52.6% 0.708 0.972 0.919 0.84 
Before presenting the numerical exercices, we propose a diagrammatical represen-
tation of the labour market equilibrium at given capital stock and at the stationary 
state. This diagrarnmatical apparatus will provide good intuitions on the interactions 
between capacity utilization and markup variations in the short runo It will thus be 
very usefull to understand why the short run effects of a same shock depends crucially 
on the value of the capacity utilisation rate when the shock occurS. It will also provide 
a better understanding of the role played by the parameters 'Y and 7 of the utility 
function. 
Figure 1: Instantaneous and stationary equilibria in the labour market 
Wt 
Equilibrium at Given K t - w Stationary State 1 
8-1
-d-ar-----
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4.1 A Representation of the Labour Market Equilibrium 
In the two panels of figure 1, the upward-sloping curve represents the labour supply 
curve (see equation (3) with U given by (22)). The other curve (sloping downwards in 
figure La. horizontal in figure 1.b) represents the macroeconomic labour demand curve 
12 
given by equation (11) (combined of course with equations (12), (13), (16)). In the 
previous section, the s.tationary state wage level has been shown to be independent of 
the employrnent level. so that the long-term labour demand curve is horizontal (figure 
l.b). In the very short run, Le. at given capital stock, the labour demand curve is 
sloping downwards and intersects the two axes. It necessarily intersects the horizontal 
axis because, even at zero wage, the short run demand for labour is bounded aboye by 
the number of available work-stations corresponding to the full employrnent of installed 
capacities (Le., from equation (11) in that case, Lt = btKt-datJ). As labour and capital 
are complementary, higher employrnent levels imply a higher capacity utilization rateo 
The capacity utilization rate and other related variables (the proportion 1T'clt, markups) 
thus vary along the labour demand curve. Conversely, when L goes to zero, all firms 
underutilise their productive capacity and 1T'clt = 1. The input price p is then equal 
to 1 and the feasible real wage is equal to (1 - l/e) a (see (21)). Along the short 
run labour demand curve, there is thus a negative relationship between the demand 
elasticity of sales (1T'dt) and employment: a downwards shift along the short run labour 
demand curve corresponds to an increase in the proportion of firms that produce at 
full capacity and therefore to an increase in the markup rateo 
4.2 Transitional Dynamics: Numerical Simulations 
In this section. we analyse successively the effects of four structural changes: an increase 
in governement spendings G, a labour and capital augmenting technical progress (in-
crease in the productivity coefficients a and b), a labour augmenting technical progress 
(increase in a), an increase in the elasticity of substitution between goods e. 
In each case. we first present a qualitative analysis of the instantaneous and long run 
impacts on the basis of the diagrammatical apparatus presented in the previous section. 
For the two economies (High ¡j and Low D), we next report the time profiles of the 
capacity utilization rate (fig. 2-3-4.a), the markup rate (fig. 2-3-4.c), the proportion 
of firms facing a sales constraint (fig. 2-3-4.e), the real wage rate (fig 2-3-4.b), the 
employment (fig. 2-3-4.d) and output (fig. 2-3-4.f) levels. In each case, the vertical 
axis measures the gap (in %) between the value of the variable at time t and its value 
at the initial stationary state. The size of the four shocks has been calibrated so as to 
produce a 1% increase in final output Y at the new stationary state. 
a) Permanent Increase in Government Purchases 
i) Qualitative Analysis (figure a in Appendix []) 
A (permanent) increase in G leaves the labour demand curves unaffected and only shifts 
the labour supply curve to the right (negative wealth effect). Both the instantaneous 
and the steady state effect on output are unambiguously positive. 
The instantaneous output increase is achieved thanks to a more intensive use of ex-
isting capacities (downwards move along the short run labour demand curve). The 
instantaneous effect thus depends crucially on the capacity utilization rate at the time 
of the public spending increase. For instance. if the economy lies in the fiat part of 
the labour demand curve (low utilization .rates), firms will respond to the increase in 
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G by raising production with little change in markup and prices. H, to the contrary, 
the utilization rate is .high when the change occurs (in the steeper part of the curve), 
firms will raise their markup and there will be littIe output effect in the short runo 
ii) Numerical Simulation (see figure ·2) 
As expected, the short ron effects of the gouvernement spending increase are much 
more expansionary in the Low D economy than in the High Done. The instantaneous 
output change in the former is even twice larger than in the latter where firms have 
initialIy more market power and raise much more their markup. 
FolIowing the initial increase in the capacity utilization rate (with a drop in 7T"d), the 
transitional dynamics are mainly driven by iIlcreased investments. During this phase, 
the output increase is smaller than the capacity extensions; there is thus a progressive 
falI in the capacity utilization and in the markup rates. The correlation between output 
and D t (and thus between output and markups) is thus negative during this phase. 
b) Labour and Capital Augmenting Technical Change 
\Ve consider here an increase in the average productivities a and b with a/b constant. 
i) Qualitative Analysis (figure b in Appendíx 3) 
On the left-hand part of figure 1, the productivity gain shifts the labour demand curve 
upwards (as labour is more productive, any level of employment is now compatible with 
a higher real wage). However. the maximum employrnent level is unchanged since, at 
given capital stock, the simultaneous increase in the productivity of both factors has 
not changed the number of available work-stations in the economy. The labour supply 
curve shifts upwards. As a result of these two shifts, the instantaneous effect of the 
global productivity increase on ~he capacity utilization rate and the employment level is 
ambiguous, although final output is clearly stimulated. The net effect on employment 
can be positive or negative, depending on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. There are two counteracting forces at work: the increase in productive 
capacities produced by the change in b (at given Kt-d and the positive wealth effect 
on the supply of labour. Note however that, in the short run, the expansionary effects 
of the productivity gain is likely to be larger when there are initialIy few idle capacities 
(equilibrium in the steeper part of the curve) than when capital is widely in excess. 
In the right-hand part of figure 1, both the long run feasible wage and labour supply 
curves shift upwards. ConsequentIy, the effects on L and K are again ambiguous even 
though the stationary level of output is increased. As the increase in b reduces the 
cost of capital per unit of output, the input firm can choose a more "risky" investment 
policy, i.e., a policy with a lower expected capacity utilization rateo D is thus slightly 
lower at the new stationary state. 
ii) Numerical Simulation (see figure 3) 
With our calibration. we need a productivity gain of more than 1% to produce 
a 1% increase in the stationary level of final output. This means a lower level of 
employment and capital at the new stationary equilibrium. In the present case, the 
capacity utilization variable seems finally to play líttle role in the transmission of the 
global productivity gain. In fact, D t falIs. This is because the productivity gain affects 
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installed capital as well as labour, and increases the productive capacity of firms at 
once. Hence, the fact that the output increase is initially larger than 1% does not 
follow from a more intensive use of installed capital but from a reduction in market 
power associated to a lower capacity utilisation rateo As expected, this effect is larger 
in the High D economy than in the Low Done. 
e) Labour Augmenting Technical Progress a. 
We now consider an increase in the productivity of labour, at unchanged capital pro-
ductivity. 
i) Qualitative Analysis (figure e in Appendix 3) 
In the short run, the increase in the productivity of labour reduces the maximum 
employment level (less workers are now necessary for a given productive capacity) but 
increases the maximum wage leve!. The short run labour demand curve thus moves 
upwards at low levels of employment and inwards near the maximum employment 
leve!. As in b), the labour supply curve shifts upwards. The instantaneous effects of 
the productivity gain depend crucially on whether the initial employment level is to 
the left or to the right of the intersection point between the old and the new demand 
curves. i.e .. on whether the initial equilibrium capacity utilization rate is small (flat 
part of the labour demand curve) or large (steep part of the labour demand curve). 
In the first case, the productivity gain induces an instantaneous rise in real wages 
while the effect on employrnent remains ambiguous and depends on the labour supply 
behavior. In the second case, whatever U, the instantaneous effect on employrnent is 
negative; the size of the employment contraction determines whether the short run real 
wage falls increases. 
The stationary levels of output and capital are higher; the stationary effect on employ-
ment remains ambiguous. 
ii) Numerical Simulation (see figure 3) 
The two numerical exercices illustrate the "second" case referred aboye. The short 
run employrnent level falls below its new stationary value in both economies. At given 
capital productivity, the labour productivity gain leacls in the short ron to an increase 
in capacity utilization and in markup rates. But the increase in D t is larger in the 
Low D economy than in the High Done whereas markups increase more in the latter 
than in the former. The employment contraction is thus much larger in the High D 
economy than in the Low Done. In the short run, the equilibrium real wage has to 
decrease in the former but can increase irnmediately in the latter. 
It is also worth stressing that a labour productivi ty gain generates strikingly differ-
ent dynamic paths and short run effects than a global (labour and capital) productivity 
gain, although the long run effects are similar. As it appears clearly in figure 3, the 
instantaneous effects on the capacity utilization rate, the proportion 7rdt, the markup 
rate and the real wage go in opposite directions and the time profiles of output and 
employment are very different. 
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Figure 3: Productivity Increases 
2.a capacity utilisation rate 
lr------.------r----r---,....----, 2 
2.1"> real wage 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
Low D: 
High D : 
a 
n&b-
a 
as:' b--
1.5 
0.5 
O r---=:::::;:3~~~=~ O 
-0.2 L-__------------~ -0.5 
3 3 'i 9 11 
-O.-l '------'----'-----'------''-----' 
1 
-1 
1 :3 5 'i 9 11 
2.c mark-up 
2.5 ,....----,..---,---....,----,....----, 
-0.1 
2 -0.2 
1.5 -0.3 
-0.4 
0.3 -O .:J 
O ~:::;;;;;;;:::::;:======~ -o.n 
-0.5 -0.7 
-1 L-_---l.__--L__-'--__l....-__ 
-0.8 
3.d employm~JJt 
1 3 5 7 9 11 1 3 [) 'i 9 11 
2 
3.e firms facing a sales constraint 
1.1 
3.f final output 
1 1 
O 0.9 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
-5 0.5 
-6 
1 :3 )) 7 9 11 
0.'1 
1 :l 5 7 9 11 
17 
d) Increase in the Elasticity of Substitution 8 
i) Qualitative Analysis (figure d in Appendix 3) 
Although the price elasticity of demand is constant in this model, it ~ould not be too 
difficult to endogenize it I8 • Here, we simply assume an exogenous change in 8. This wil! 
allow us to assess qualitatively the combined effects of changes in the price elasticity 
of demand 8 and in the demand elasticity of sales 7T'd, which determine together the 
markup rateo Changes in the latter simply corresponds to movements along the short 
run labour demand curve; changes in 8 shift the labour demand curve itself. 
The increase in 8 leads the intermediate firms to lower their margins. Both the short 
run and the long run labour demand curve now shift upwards, and the real wage 
comes closer to the marginal productivity of labour a. A positive wealth effect shifts 
the labour supply schedule upwards. These two shifts are responsible for the same 
ambiguities as in the global productivity change. Although output is stimulated, the 
net effect on employment can be positive or negative, depending on the value of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
ii) Numerical Simulation (see figure 4) 
In both economies, the effect on employment and capital is positive. The increase 
in the price elasticity of demand has two immediate and opposite effects on markups. 
The first effect (linked directly to the elasticity change) dominates clearly the second 
one (linked to the higher capacity utilisation rate I9 ). The markup thus falls below its 
initial value. 
However. when comparing the time profiles of the variables in the two economies, 
it appears clearly that the increase inDt interacts with the change in 8. It implies 
that the initial reduction in market power is lower in the High D economy than in 
the Low Done. The initial output increase is thus much larger in the latter. In both 
economies. however, the correlation between markup and output is negative during the 
adjustment phase. 
5. Conclusions 
Our objective was to develop a dynamic intertemporal model with imperfect compe-
tition, wherein the combined effects of capacity utilization and markup rate changes 
could be discussed. By introducing microeconomic demand uncertainty and aggregat-
ing over firms, we have been able to obtain a model wherein capacity underutilization 
is a macroeconomic equilibrium feature. In this setup, capacity utilization and markup 
rate changes are related via the effect of the former on the firm's actual market power. 
We studied these interactions and their implications for the dynamic behavior of sorne 
key macro variables in response to various "structural" shocks. Capacity constraints 
introduce potentially important non-linearities in the dynamic adjustment path. The 
same shock can have quite different effects depending on the characteristics of the ini-
18The easiest solution would be to introduce a relationship between the price elasticity of demand 
and the composition of aggregate demand (see e.g. d'Aspremont et alii (op citum), Gali (op citum). 
19At any capacity level, the increase in degree of substituability between goods eases the spillover 
effects between firms. There are thus less firms facing a sales constraint than before. 
18 
tial stationary state (low or high capacity utilization rate). We should emphasize in 
this context that the positive relationship between capacity utilization and markup 
rates does not imply per se a positive correlation between output and markup rates 
over the cycle. The latter correlation can be positive or negative, and depends on the 
correlation between productive capacities and output. It was furthermore shown that 
changes in the priee elasticity of demand have a large positive efi'ect on output and 
capacity utilization, and still a negative efi'ect on markup rates. In other words, by 
extending the model so as to allow the price elasticity of demand to vary with output, 
one can generate complex and varied correlation patterns between capacity utilization, 
markups, real wages and output. 
The model presented in this paper can be used as a starting point for further 
developments. The next logical step is of course to complete the model with stochastic 
processes and to examine the characteristics of the cyclical f1.uctuations so generated. 
We leave this topie for future research. 
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Figure 4: Elasticity of Substitution Increase 
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Appendix 1: Financial markets equilibrium 
Although there is uncertainty at the individual firm level (in the intermediate good 
sector), there is no aggregate uncertainty. At a symmetric equilibrium, all the inter-
mediate good (input) firm have the same expected rate of profit at a given point in 
time. Consumers thus choose to diversify and eliminate risk by holding shares of all 
the intermediate good firms. The number of shares is assumed to be fixed and invest-
ment in fixed capital is entirely financed by borrowing at the market rate of interest. 
Because risk can be eliminated by diversification, bonds and (the market portfolio of) 
shares must, by arbitrage, bear the same sure rate of return. 
Let q{ and q~ represent the market value of final good firms and of intermediate good 
I 
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firms respectively. The corresponding share prices must satisfy for aH t ~ 1 the foHow-
ing dynamic relationships: 
with 
q{+l + II{+1 - (1 + Tt+d q{ with II{+1 = Yi+l - Pt+l Yi+l 
where II{+1 and II~+1 represent the aggregate profit levels of the two types of firms. 
In every period t, the demand for assets by households is then given by: 
iqt [1At = [ 1+ qt + (1 + Tt) K t - 1] + IIt + IIi t + WtLt - Ct 
The financial markets equilibrium condition requires: 
At = qt 1 + qt i + Kt . 
Appendix 2: Influences of Parameters on the Stationary Equilibrium 
The table below gives the signs of the partial derivatives (at the stationary equilibrium) 
of the capacity utilization rate, D, the proportion Íld, (8Íld)-1 (Le., the markup in 
percentage points), the spillover effect p-o and the real wage W with respect to the 
parameters 0';,8, b, a, /3 and G. 
a and b a 8 /3 G 
D o + O 
+ O + O 
O + O 
O + O 
+ + + + O 
In the case of the global productivity increase, the increase in b reduces the cost of 
capital per unit of output. The input firms can choose a more "risky" investment 
policy, i.e., a policy with a lower expected degree of capacity utilization. At macroe-
conomic equilibriwn, D is thus lower. In the case of a labour productivity increase at 
unchanged capital productivity, the real cost of capital remains unaffected, hence the 
capacity utilization rate and the proportion Íld are unchanged. 
A mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the parameters v reduces both D and 
Íld. The larger O'~, the larger the mismatch between demands and supplies. A mean-
preserving spread thus reduces the capacity utilization rate at any capacity leve!. In 
order to compensate the resulting 1055 of profitability, firms increase their markup rate 
(lower Íld). 
The larger 8, the lower margin and the higher the relative cost of overcapacity (equip-
ments are less profitable). Firms thus restore their profitability by decreasing the 
probability of a sale shortage, thereby choosing to increase their average capacity uti-
lization rateo 
An increase in /3 reduces the real capital cost ando at given F(v), allows the firms to 
reduce their optimal capacity utilization rate.-
• ! 
Appendix 3: Short- and Long-runs Effects of Structural Changes 
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c. Labour Productivity Increase 
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